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Abstract:  
Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about 
what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the 
ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands 
of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as 
ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such 
dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with 
three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock 
loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates 
as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the 
regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also 
found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in 
particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than 
the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount 
of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper 
provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without 
a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to 
design better credit contracts to address the poor’s needs.  
 
Keywords: Microcredit, uptake, ultra-poor, program design, Bangladesh 
JEL Classification: D12, G21, O12, O16 
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1. Introduction  
It is widely recognized that lack of access to the formal financial market is 
among the major impediments keeping poor households in developing countries from 
improving their livelihoods (Kono and Takahashi, 2010). A recent innovation in poverty 
alleviation has been the emergence of microcredit, which provides collateral-free loans 
of small value to low-income households that have been deemed unbankable. Based on 
success in the form of high repayment rates worldwide, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) have increased rapidly. As of 2010, they attract more than 205 million clients 
around the world (Maes and Reed, 2012). In 2006, a microcredit front-runner, the 
Grameen Bank, and its founder, Professor Yunus, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
for their contribution to poverty reduction.  
Despite growing enthusiasm regarding its potential, however, recent rigorous 
empirical studies have shown that microcredit is not a silver bullet for poverty reduction 
(Karlan and Zinman, 2011; Banerjee et al., 2013; Creon et al., 2013; Roodman and 
Morduch, 2014). In particular, many existing studies note that the poorest of the poor, or 
the ultra-poor, have been excluded from microcredit services (Morduch, 1999; Navajas 
et al., 2000; Duong and Izumida, 2002; Copestake et al., 2005; Cuong, 2008). For 
example, Copestake et al. (2005) find that microcredit programs in Zambia are not 
reaching the extremely poor, but are mainly targeting households at the upper margins 
of poverty, some even targeting those above the poverty line. Similarly, Navajas et al. 
(2000) show that five MFIs in Bolivia work with households just above and below the 
poverty line, but not with the extremely poor, and Lonborg and Rasmussen (2014) 
conclude that microfinance in nothern Malawi adopts regressive targeting.  
There seem to be both demand- and supply-side constraints on the provision of 
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microcredit to the ultra-poor. On the one hand, MFIs may hesitate to lend money to the 
ultra-poor due to fear of their high default risk. It is widely believed that the ultra-poor 
demand cash more for meeting daily ends rather than for productive investment to 
expand a business, even though MFIs often require clients to use their loans only for 
business purposes (see e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2012). Ghana’s case shows that returns 
to credit to the poor are significantly higher when credit is provided in kind rather than 
in cash presumably because the credit is partly used outside of microenterprises 
(Fafchamps et al., 2014). The existence of this so-called flypaper effect, whereby 
“capital coming directly into the business sticks there, but cash does not” (Fafchamps et 
al., 2014), is likely to increase the probability of default. Moral hazard may also be 
more severe for the ultra-poor if they are more mobile than the moderately poor and 
non-poor because of their lack of immobile assets.  
On the other hand, the expected returns to credit may not be sufficiently high 
for the ultra-poor, thereby inducing them to exclude themselves. Indeed, while existing 
studies show high average returns to capital in self-employed- or micro-enterprises on 
which most microcredit is placed (Udry and Anagol, 2006; de Mel et al., 2008; 
Fafchamps et al., 2014), evidence has accumulated that not every client can benefit from 
microcredit: Banerjee et al. (2014) show that impacts on income are positive only for 
households with an existing business or those who manage to start a business, while de 
Mel et al. (2008) find that returns to credit significantly differ with clients’ 
entrepreneurial ability and household wealth. These findings imply that the expected 
returns to credit could be low for the ultra-poor, who are characterized by less 
experience or willingness to participate in self-employed activities due to risk aversion 
as well as a lack of entrepreneurial ability. Exclusively targeting the ultra-poor in India, 
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Morduch et al. (2013) provide supporting evidence that microcredit programs for the 
ultra-poor result in neither significantly greater total income nor asset accumulation by 
its clients.  
Irrespective of whether these possible supply- and demand-side constraints 
actually bind, the ultra-poor have long been excluded from microcredit services despite 
the professed goal of microcredit to improve the welfare of the poor. Yet, assumptions 
that the ultra-poor have a smaller demand for microcredit and/or that expected returns 
on ultra-poor lending are lower than on moderately poor lending have not been 
adequately validated. If these assumptions are incorrect, they would adversely affect not 
only efficiency but also equality. To prove the bankability of the ultra-poor, therefore, 
rigorous analysis is clearly required. Although prior studies have explored 
heterogeneous returns to microcredit (de Mel et al., 2008; Banerjee et al., 2014), little 
work has examined heterogeneous demands for microcredit across wealth classes. Also, 
while some studies have examined how microcredit contract designs affect repalyment 
rates and returns to credit (de Mel et al., 2008; Field and Pande, 2008; McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2008; Fischer and Ghatak, 2010; Field et al., 2013; Fafchamps et al., 2014; 
Gine and Karlan, 2014; Shonchoy and Kurosaki, 2014), few have explored what 
microcredit designs suit the poor’s needs. According to Field et al. (2013), more 
risk-averse clients generally benefit more if a grace period is provided in the repayment 
schedule. Hulme (1999) discusses that poorer clients are more likely to drop out from 
microcredit sevices if a high-value loans are offered. Do these observations imply that a 
microcredit contract with a smaller value and/or with a grace period induces a higher 
probability of participation among the extremely poor? Alternatively, do the ultra-poor 
demand loans of large amounts from the beginning if there is non-convexity in 
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technology and they need a lumpy investment at the beginning of the project to move 
them out of poverty traps (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Lybbert 
and Barrett, 2010)?  
To fill this knowledge gap, this study sheds light on differential uptake rates 
across microcredit designs between the ultra-poor and moderately poor. Our sample 
comprises households that expressed interest in microcredit. We then randomly offer a 
particular type of microcredit product to these households. Between notification of 
random assignment and actual loan distribution, we ask their willingness to join the 
microcredit program. This survey structure permits us to effectively exclude the 
possiblity that those who drop out from our program at the second participation decision 
are the ones who fail to repay loans and are thereby forced to leave or the ones who 
graduate from microcredit with success. Thus, unlike previous studies, which do not 
clearly distinguish dropouts from defaulters and graduates (Hulme, 1999; Siliki, 2012), 
our survey provides a unique opportunity to determine the pure preferences of the poor 
regarding loan contract types. To explore this issue in detail, this study employs 
microdata generated from our randomized controlled trial in the river island areas in 
northern Bangladesh, where periodic floods and land erosion severely affect the 
livelihoods of its dwellers, making the majority of the population vulnerable and poor.  
More specifically, we introduced the following four treatment arms. The first 
treatment arm is a regular microcredit program with a small loan amount, which 
requires clients to start repayment two weeks after receiving the loan, with one-year 
maturity. The second treatment arm provides a loan that is three times larger than the 
regular program, with three-year maturity. The third treatment arm adjusts the second 
one, giving borrowers a one-year grace period before they start repaying but offers the 
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same three-year maturity (effectively repaying in two years). The last treatment arm is 
the in-kind loan with necessary services to implement a microenterprise project using 
the loan as an investment. This arm has the same features as the third arm except for the 
fact that the loan is provided in kind. The designated in-kind investment is a cow, as 
suggested by numerous NGOs and other community-based organizations in the study 
site as the most popular and plausibly the only viable investment option for 
microfinance program borrowers. In comparison to smaller livestock such as goats, 
cows are more versatile in flood-prone areas, while they require the maximum of one 
year to start giving milk, which corresponds to the grace period length provided under 
the third and fourth treatment arms. Additional services to assist dairy production, such 
as animal fodder, veterinary services, training programs, and marketing consultancy 
services were also provided. It is expected that the in-kind credit (or a lease) program 
thus designed would overcome the problem of lack of entrepreneurial experience and 
ability of the ultra-poor. 
Our results show that, among both the moderately poor and ultra-poor, the 
uptake rate is lowest for the regular contract, followed by the rate for the in-kind 
contract. It is also found that the ultra-poor’s microcredit demand is not necessarily 
small, and in particular, the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join the program 
than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to large-scale 
loans, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the study site, 
sampling framework, and detailed designs of the randomized microcredit contract 
experiment. Section 3 discusses summary statistics of the sample households. Section 4 
outlines the estimation strategy, followed by a discussion of the estimation results in 
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Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Study Settings  
2.1. Study Area 
The study was conducted in the river island areas, known as Chars in Bengali, 
of northern Bangladesh in Gaibandha and Kurigram districts. Chars are formed by 
sediments and silt depositions, and are prone to cyclical river erosion and floods. Chars 
are, by nature, not stable in size and even in existence, and episodes of their partial or 
complete erosion or sub-merging are quite common. Chars accommodate ultra-poor 
inhabitants who are forced, as a desperate attempt for survival, to relocate across islands 
due to river erosion and floods (Barkat et al., 2007; Shonchoy, 2014). Seasonal floods 
periodically occur during the wet seasons as monsoon precipitation swells the river 
together with glacial melting of the Himalayas, causing heavy downstream inflows of 
water that pass through the rivers of Bangladesh to reach the Bay of Bengal. 
Boats are the major mode of transportation in Char areas. The majority of boat 
services are run by the informal sector, and the services are vulnerable to bad weather 
conditions and are infrequent. Due to the poor transportation infrastructure, few 
governmental services, like health and education, are available (Marks and Vignon, 
2008). Char dwellers have extremely limited access to regular markets. Provision of 
national grid electricity is rare, and hardly any Chars have been properly electrified by 
the Rural Electrification Board of Bangladesh. Even microfinance services are scarce on 
Chars despite widespread networks of MFIs in northern Bangladesh (Khandker, 2005). 
 
2.2. Sampling Strategy  
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The sampling of our survey involves multiple stages, or a double-stratified 
two-stage clustered sampling; in the first stage, we selected Chars (villages, as the 
primary survey unit: PSU), and in the second stage, we selected households (as the 
secondary survey unit: SSU). In both stages, we stratified PSU and SSU. Our sample 
frame is poor residents of island Chars without MFI activities in Gaibandha and 
Kurigram districts. We describe the detailed procedures of the sampling strategy below. 
Char selection: Chars could be categorized as islands, peninsulas, or bridged Chars 
based on the existing connection with river banks. The present study mainly 
concentrated on island Chars, which are completely detached from river banks.1 We 
initially used Landsat images to identify sample Chars. Given that Chars are unstable, 
we needed to use the most recent images (April, 2012) before the time of the baseline 
survey (September–October, 2012). By visual inspection, we counted the number of 
Chars throughout the image and inspected all Chars by field visits. Figure 1 shows the 
number of points on the Landsat image where GPS coordinates were measured to 
determine the rough location information of each Char. Upon a field visit, the local area 
staff of our counterpart NGO, Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK)2 identified the name of 
each Char and verified the existence of inhabitants on the Char. GUK provided us with 
a list of all the villages over the points shown in the image (Figure 1). 
Once we identified Chars, we collected detailed information on existing 
program coverage or development assistance run by different NGOs or humanitarian 
                                                 
1
 Peninsula Chars are divided by small, perennial streams or sometimes even merely connected to 
river banks when the water level is low. Bridged Chars are a type of island Chars lying next to a 
river bank and are connected by an earthen passage. 
2
 GUK is an NGO with 28 years of experience conducting development and microfinance activities 
in northern Bangladesh and one of the very few NGOs that works directly with Char dwellers. 
10 
 
agencies in different villages on these Chars. Our aim was to select only those villages 
without pre-existing microcredit activities by other MFIs. We did not find it difficult to 
locate Chars without microfinance services, as most MFIs in northern Bangladesh target 
clients predominantly from the mainland areas. We found a few Char villages having 
some NGO coverage, with these NGOs mainly conducting non-financial activities, such 
as education or health provision, or disaster-related relief and support activities. We took 
particular care not to select any village under the existing coverage of the Chars 
Livelihoods Program (CLP), which makes attempts similar to our interventions.3 
Through these procedures, we collected information on 128 Chars that fulfilled our 
selection criteria, and out of this list, we randomly selected 80 Chars, stratified based on 
the distance to nearby boat stations.        
Household selection: Household selection within each village was conducted in 
two steps. In the first step, employing the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) method 
with the help of local elites, religious leaders, and GUK staff members, we listed all the 
households in each village and ranked them according to their wealth categorization 
(non-poor, moderately poor, or ultra-poor) based on GUK’s wealth gradation criterion.4 
                                                 
3
 The Chars Livelihoods Program (CLP) is jointly funded by the UK and Australia through the 
Department for International Development and the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID), respectively, to move extremely poor households living on Chars in northwestern Bangladesh 
out of poverty. CLP has designed a packaged grant intervention that consists of an asset purchasing fund, 
stipends, and other social interventions, given to beneficiaries selected through eligibility criteria.      
4
 The eligibility criteria used by GUK to identify an ultra-poor household are households: a) without any 
source of regular income and/or totally dependent on other people; b) exposed to chronic food insecurity, 
i.e., members of the households often skip meals due to food insufficiency; c) with gross monthly per 
capita income below Tk. 800; d) without any land or shelter on embankment or other place; e) with at 
least one family member suffering from malnutrition; f) with at least one family member with disability 
and/or chronic illness; g) without any livestock or productive assets that generate income. The criteria to 
11 
 
Then, GUK officials randomly visited the listed ultra-poor households to verify whether 
the categorization was carried out accurately and truthfully, following which the list was 
sent to the research team. Typically, it took three working days to complete all the 
required tasks for one village. 
Once we received the list of all the households that reside in a village on a 
particular Char, we separately listed a group of ultra-poor households (UP) and a group 
of moderately poor households (MP) households. Then, in each group, we randomly 
re-arranged the order of households. These two sequences of household names,5 which 
were randomly ordered in a mutually exclusive way, were sent back to GUK to select 14 
UP and 6 MP from each village on the Char. We included both UP and MP households 
to determine the differential demands for our planned interventions. A larger weight was 
given to UP than MP households, in a 7 to 3 ratio, since the majority of Char dwellers 
belong to the UP category. The group size for each village was kept at 20 to follow the 
GUK’s typical microcredit group size, where loans are distributed with individual 
liability, but a group is formulated for the purpose of peer monitoring.  
Using the above-mentioned random sequences, GUK was instructed to give an 
offer of microcredit group membership to households such that there would be four 
different credit products assigned randomly at the group level, but the group members at 
the time of registration did not know which one of the four they would be assigned. 
Residents were also notified that the treatment status will be randomized among each 
group, so there is a chance of being in the control group. If the household accepts the 
                                                                                                                                               
distinguish a moderately poor household from the non-poor are similar, only with higher thresholds than 
the above. 
5
 By name, we mean the eligible female member/s of the household as GUK’s microcredit program is 
given only to women. 
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condition, it is offered formal microcredit group membership; if it rejects the offer, 
another household is drawn from the randomly ordered list to be offered a membership. 
This process is repeated until the target group size of 20 households per village is 
secured, with 14 UP and 6 MP members. Following this process, we created 80 groups 
of 20 potential clients each, with one group per Char village.  
After the group formation, a detailed survey (baseline survey) was 
administered to understand the socioeconomic conditions of Char dwellers. The survey 
included questions on household and personal characteristics; details of land holding 
and leasing; durable and non-durable asset information; and debt, savings, and credit 
information. The detailed timeline of our survey and sampling steps are given in Figure 
2.  
 
2.3. Experimental Design  
Once our baseline survey was completed, we implemented the randomized 
credit offer in two levels: Char and household levels. First, we randomly allocated 80 
groups of Char villages into one of the following four treatment arms (clustered 
randomization). Second, within each Char, the credit was given only to 10 (i.e., 7 UP 
and 3 MP) randomly selected households (hereafter, treated households) in the initial 
phase, and other members (hereafter, control households) would need to wait at least for 
a year to receive credit. On the whole, we had 800 treatment and 800 control households 
with village-level clustered randomization across four treatment arms as follows:  
Regular microcredit (RC): The design of this treatment arm is similar to that 
of the flagship Grameen-style microcredit lending, which is widespread in Bangladesh. 
Under this treatment arm, members of the group will receive 5,600 taka credit, with 
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loan repayment to begin two weeks after disbursement. The amount is approximately 
8% of the average annual household income according to our baseline survey. Members 
will repay under a weekly repayment scheme and will be required to attend weekly 
meetings as well as to regularly save an amount decided jointly by the group members. 
The contract maturity of this loan is one year, and if borrowers successfully repay the 
due amount following the repayment discipline, they are eligible for another two loan 
contracts of equivalent amounts over the next consecutive years. The required regular 
weekly repayment for this group is 125 taka, payable in 50 weekly installments. 
Large credit, without a grace period (LC): Under this treatment arm, group 
members will receive 16,800 taka credit with a longer period of loan maturity, where 
loan repayments begin two weeks after disbursement The loan repayment discipline is 
the same as in the RC groups. The contract maturity period of this loan is three years. 
The required weekly repayment for this group is 125 taka payable in 150 weekly 
installments (for three years). 
Large credit, with a one-year grace period (LC + GP): Under this treatment 
arm, group members will receive 16,800 taka credit with loan repayments to begin one 
year after disbursement. The loan repayment discipline is the same as in the RC groups. 
However, during the first year grace period, members are required to meet weekly and 
follow group activities such as compulsory savings. The contract maturity of this loan is 
three years. The required weekly repayment for this group is 190 taka payable in 100 
weekly installments, starting after one year.  
In-kind credit, with a one-year grace period (IK + GP): Under this 
treatment arm, group members will be eligible to receive in-kind credit in the form of a 
cow, within the price range of 16,000 taka with loan repayment to begin one year after 
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disbursement. In addition, the members will receive fodder, training on cow rearing, 
regular VET and vaccination services, and marketing consultancy services from the 
GUK authority, worth 800 taka for the entire service given over three years. The loan 
repayment discipline and contract maturity of this in-kind loan are the same as the LC + 
GP groups. The required weekly repayment for this group is 190 taka payable in 100 
weekly installments, starting after one year. Detailed designs of our randomization 
protocol and treatment arms are given in Figure 3.  
After the clustered randomization for different treatment arms at the village 
level, we randomly selected 7 UP and 3 MP households from each group for the initial 
loan distribution. We kept the rest as waiting members who need to wait for at least a 
year to become eligible to borrow, but still need to attend weekly meetings. It was also 
explained that the type of credit to be offered to the control households would be the 
same as that offered to the treatment households within the same group.6 
Once this two-level randomization was completed, we announced the 
randomization results to our group members and explained that they would need to 
decide whether or not to accept the offer before the actual loan disbursement. It is 
important to note that the initial registration was made before the specifics of the arms 
were revealed, and all the subjects in our sample agreed to participate at that time. So no 
selection had occurred by the time of compliance according to the specific contents of 
each arm, except for the fact that they selected themselves into an unknown 
microfinance program. This gives us an opportunity to study the clients’ response to 
various types of microcredit contracts, which has not been clearly addressed in the 
                                                 
6
 The objective to have control households is to create exogenous variations within the group to identify 
the impact of credit, which will be examined in detail in future research. 
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previous literature. 
 
3. Summary Statistics 
3.1.Household Characteristics and Balance Test 
Table 1 presents selected demographic and wealth information for the sample 
households, collected before announcement of the treatment arms and credit eligibility. 
To examine whether the clustered randomization functions as expected, the means in 
differences between the RC group (the reference group) and each of the other three 
groups are also compared at the household as well as the group level, where the 
group-level mean differences are computed by setting the group as the unit of 
observation.  
The annual total household income is, on average, 73 thousand taka (equivalent 
to USD903).7 Approximately 55% of sample households are classified as poor if we set 
a daily per capita income of 49.56 taka as a poverty line, following the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics’ computation of regional poverty lines used in Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey in 2010. The majority of Char dwellers are actively engaged in 
wage employment, including temporary migration (Shonchoy and Kurosaki, 2014). 
Indeed, the predominant source of income for our sample households is wage 
employment, followed by non-farm enterprises. The role of agriculture is minor partly 
because less than 1% of the sample households report owning agricultural land and 
partly because productivity and cropping intensity are substantially low due to the 
infertility of the sandy soil and periodic flooding. Livestock and poultry provide 
supplementary income to sample households; 48% of the households had, at least once, 
                                                 
7
 1 USD is equivalent to 97 BDT as of September 2012. 
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raised livestock, especially small animals like goats or cows through an informal leasing 
contract, locally known as Adhi. At the same time, as the average number of current 
cattle holdings, including cows, oxen, and calves, is small (less than one, as shown in 
the table), the percentage contribution of livestock to total household income is small.  
The average household size is slightly more than four, with the dependency 
ratio (number of household members below 15 and above 65 years relative to the 
number of household members between 15 and 64 years) equal to approximately 0.9. 
The average age of the household head is 39 years, and about 91% of them are male. 
Many household heads have never received formal education, with the average years of 
completed education well below one year. The sample households have lived in the 
current location for 5 years, with approximately 70% of them being in the Gaibandha 
district.  
As far as balance tests are concerned, overall balance seems to be achieved, but 
some variables are significantly different across treatment arms. For example, the 
average years of education for household heads are highest within the IK + GP group, 
followed by those in the LC group, both of which are statistically significantly longer 
than in the RC group. It is also revealed that years in current location are significantly 
longer among the LC group than in the RC group. Given that our randomization was at 
the village level and we have only 80 sample villages, such imbalances may be 
unavoidable. Since the treatment arms are randomized, however, covariate imbalance 
will not result in inconsistent estimates. Yet, to control for finite sample biases caused 
by imbalances in baseline characteristics, we will include them as control variables in 
our regression analysis.  
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3.2.Uptake of the Microcredit Program 
Table 2 reports group- and household-level uptake status by treatment arms and 
rejection types. In Table 2A, the top panel shows the total number, while the middle and 
bottom panels show the number within the treated households that are eligible to receive 
credit immediately and control households that should wait for more than a year to 
become clients, respectively. We presume that the reasons for rejecting the offer will 
differ between treated and control households. Namely, the treated households may 
reject the offer if the offered credit design does not suit their needs while the control 
households may reject it if they do not want to wait for a long period, during which they 
have to attend weekly meetings; this could be an additional reason to the mismatch of 
the offered credit design with their needs.  
Out of these 80 groups, 4 groups were not able to join the program because 
they were affected by erosion and forced to relocate after early November 2012. 
Because each erosion-affected household had to find a new location geographically 
scattered over Chars, transaction costs to trace them became prohibitively high. As a 
result, we were not able to continue their involvement in the microcredit program. As 
this appears to be a purely exogenous event, we exclude them from the subsequent 
discussion.  
Out of the remaining 76 groups, 7 groups voluntarily quit the program after 
learning the random credit product assigned to the group. We call the event a Group 
rejection. The remaining 69 groups, which remained in the program, had 1,380 initial 
members. Out of these, 169 individuals voluntarily quit the program after learning the 
random credit product assignment to the group and the random assignment of the 
treatment status (immediate credit or waiting) to the individual. We call these events 
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Individual rejections. This implies that, on average, 2.4 individuals out of 20 members 
rejected the program when the group as a whole accepted the program. 
As can be seen, the uptake rate is lowest in the RC group. Among 360 
households in this arm who were not affected by erosion, only 226 (62.8%) households 
remained in the group after the randomization was announced. Group rejection is more 
prevalent. The rates for individual rejection do not differ greatly between the treated and 
control households within the RC arm.  
Interestingly, the second lowest uptake rate observed is among clients of the IK 
+ GP group (with an uptake rate of only 80%). This is surprising, as our a priori 
conjecture was that given limited investment choices in the study area, in-kind livestock 
credit should be no less attractive than cash credit. In fact, we obtained the impression 
from our counterpart NGO that the IK + GP arm might be even more attractive because 
it can reduce transaction costs to buy livestock animals in the market and can provide an 
opportunity to join training to enhance clients’ livestock-rearing skills. However, as 
apparent from Table 2A, the uptake rate in the IK + GP group is much lower than that in 
the LC and LC + GP groups, and the detailed analysis shows that these differences are 
statistically significant. By contrast, the difference in uptake between the LC and LC + 
GP groups seems to be statistically negligible.  
Table 2B shows the pattern of individual-level rejection within a group. Out of 
the 69 groups that did not reject the program as a group, 29 groups had no 
individual-level rejection, 13 groups had only one rejection, 15 groups had 2 to 5 
rejections, 7 groups had 6 to 9 rejections, and 5 groups had 10 or more rejections. The 
percentage of complete acceptance (no occurrence of individual-level rejection) was 
higher among the LC and LC + GP arms. 
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In sum, in the bivariate analysis, we found that the uptake rate of the IK + GP 
arm was greater than the RC arm but significantly smaller than both the LC and LC + 
GP arms.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
4.1. Conceptual Framework 
       To derive an empirical strategy to estimate uptake decisions, let us discuss a 
simple framework. We observe uptake result j  for individual i  belonging to group 
g , which is offered credit product type k  and treatment status t . We denote the 
uptake result by a dummy variable jigktY , where =j  1 (Accept), 2 (Individual 
rejection), and 3 (Group rejection); 1,2,...,20=i ; 1,2,...,76=g ; k  = 0 (RC: 
traditional), 1 (LC: large credit without grace period), 2 (LC + GP: large credit with 
grace period), and 3 (IK + GP: in-kind credit with grace period); and t  = 0 (Control: 
asked to wait for a year) and 1 (Treatment: offered the credit immediately). We estimate 
a regression model where jigktY  is used as the left-hand-side variable while other 
observables are employed as right-hand-side (R.H.S.) variables. Because the three 
uptake results are mutually exclusive, 1=jigktjY∑ .  
Let us also define the group-level uptake decision dummy, gkY , which takes the 
value of 0 if group rejection occurred and 1 if group rejection did not occur. In other 
words, if 1=3igktY , then 0=gkY  (remember that if 1=3igktY , then giY gkti ∈′∀′ 1=3 ); if 
1=1igktY  for some i  in g , then 1=gkY .  
As a benchmark to understand uptake decision-making at the group level, we 
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assume a simple model of majority voting without member interactions. Individual 
members have an unobservable, latent variable igktV , which is defined as the net benefit 
for individual member i  in group g  from continuing as a member in the program, 
where the group is randomly assigned to product k , and the member is randomly 
assigned to treatment t . A critical assumption is that igktV  does not depend on other 
members’ net benefit gktiV ′  or group-level decision-making. This is what we mean by 
without member interactions. 
We can further assume that igktV  comprises a part determined by a function of 
observables and an additional component of zero-mean, i.i.d., unobservable factor, 
igkte : 
 
,),,,(= igktigtgkgigigkt eDDXXfV +                       (1) 
where (.)f  is an unknown function, igX  is individual characteristics of member i  
in group g , gX  is group characteristics for group g , gkD  is a dummy variable for 
group g  randomly assigned credit offer k , and igtD  is a dummy variable for 
individual i  in group g  randomly assigned to treatment status t .  
The twenty members in group g  then vote for group-level acceptance or 
rejection based only on their own net benefit. Each member casts his or her vote in 
favor of acceptance if 0≥igktV  or in favor of rejection if 0<igktV  (assuming a 
continuous function for igktV , it is irrelevant whether the strict inequality is in 
acceptance or rejection). 
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The group leader simply counts the number of votes in favor of rejection. If the 
number favoring rejection (i.e., the number of members whose 0<igktV ) is above the 
threshold value (under the simple majority rule, the threshold is 10; under the two-third 
majority rule, it is 13), then group rejection occurs. For simplicity, we assume for the 
moment that the threshold is the same for all groups.8 
If the group jointly decides to reject the program, we observe 0== 21 igktigkt YY  
and 1=3igktY  for all i  belonging to group g . 
If the group jointly decides to accept the program, each of the twenty members 
decides whether or not to remain in the program purely considering his or her own 
payoff. In other words, we observe 1=1igktY  if the group accepts the program and 
0≥igktV , and we observe 1=
2
igktY  if the group accepts the program and 0<igktV . 
Given this structure, the key variable is igktpi , which is the probability that 
0≥igktV  holds. Based on equation (1), 
 
)),,,,((P= igtgkgigigktigkt DDXXfe ≤−pi                  (2) 
where P(.) denotes the probability. 
This expression shows that igktpi  is a function of observable variables igX , 
gX , gkD , and igtD . 
Another key variable is gkpi , which is the probability that group g  does not 
                                                 
8
 As there are 5 groups with 10 or more individual-level rejections (see Table 2B), one of which had 
as high as 17 rejections, the homogeneous and simple majority may not necessarily be valid for our 
sample. 
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reject the program as a group. Using the majority cut-off threshold of 10, gkpi  is the 
sum of probabilities that 10 to 20 members have ),,,( igtgkgigigkt DDXXfe ≤−  while 10 
to zero members have ),,,(> igtgkgigigkt DDXXfe− . Although well-defined as a 
binomial distribution, it is not possible to express this probability in a neat form. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that gkpi  is a function of observable variables. In other words, 
 
),,,,(=
,, gigtgkggiggk DDXXh ∈∈pi                        (3) 
where gigX ∈, is a group-level vector of igX , gigtD ∈,  is defined from igtD  in a way 
similar to gigX ∈, , and (.)h  is a function dependent on the functional form of (.)f  
and implicitly operates the group decision-making rule as mentioned above. 
Equation (3), when interpreted as an expression with unknown function (.)h , 
can correspond to other decision-making rules for a group as well. Under the simple 
model of majority voting without member interactions, the variable gX  enters 
equation (3) only by its effect on igktpi . In more general cases (for example, group-level 
decision-making reflects unequal bargaining power within a group9 or a preference for 
equality), variable gX  enters equation (3) directly as well as indirectly through its 
effect on igktpi . 
As a special case for the simple model of majority voting without member 
                                                 
9
 In our data, we came across one group that did not reject the program as a group, with as many as 
17 members who rejected the program individually. Although it is likely that this is an exceptional 
case, this suggests a possibility that some members can have a strong say in group-level 
decision-making. 
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interactions, we can consider the case where no heterogeneity exists within a group in 
the sense that igig XX ,= , where igX ,  is the group-aggregated variables (mean, 
standard deviation, etc.) of igX , and the treatment status does not affect the payoff for 
all i  in group g . Then we have  
 gkgkgigigkigkt pDXXfe ≡≤− )),,((P= ,pi ,               (4) 
 and  
 
),()(1)(20= 0}{0,1,...,2)(20
20
10=
mIpp
m
m
gk
m
gk
m
gk
−
−
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



∑pi             (5) 
which is the closed-form expression for a standard binomial distribution (Mood et al. 
1974). 
An information problem, however, exists in that we do not have binary 
information on igktV  if group rejection occurs. By construction, 0≥igktV  if 1=1igktY , 
and 0<igktV  if 1=
2
igktY . On the other hand, we cannot know whether 0≥igktV  or 
0<igktV  if 1=
3
igktY . In addition, as each group is offered one of the four credit products, 
for each group jigktY , we can observe for that specific k  only. By using the strategic 
method popular in behavioral economics, we could have obtained jigktY  for all k . 
Considering the context of microcredit, however, the application of the strategic method 
in our context was unfortunately infeasible.  
 
4.2.Estimation Strategy 
Given the information constraint, how can we implement a structural estimation 
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corresponding to the simple theoretical model? Let us assume a linear function form for 
(.)f  and the standard normal distribution for igkte  in equation (1).10 Then equation 
(2) is specified as  
 
),(=)(= 4321 θθθθθpi igktigtgkgigigkt ZDDXX Φ+++Φ            (6) 
where (.)Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, igktZ  
combines four vectors of explanatory variables to save notation, and θ  are vectors of 
parameters characterizing function (.)f . Then )|,,,(=
,,
θpi gigtgkggiggk DDXXh ∈∈ , for 
which we do not have a neat expression. As before, we denote gigtgkggig DDXX ∈∈ ,, ,,,  
by gtZ  to save notation. Then the density of 
j
igktY  given igtgkgiggig DDXXX ,,,, , ∈  is 
expressed as  
 
),|()(=),|1=(P 1 θpiθ gkgkigktgkigktigkt ZZZZY Φ  
 
),|())((1=),|1=(P 2 θpiθ gkgkigktgkigktigkt ZZZZY Φ−  
 
).|(1=),|1=(P 3 θpi gkgkgkigktigkt ZZZY −                      (7) 
Theoretically, a likelihood function exists that corresponds to the system of 
equations (7). However, computationally, it appears unrealistic to estimate parameters 
θ  by the maximum likelihood method as the function gkpi  does not have a compact 
expression. When individual members are heterogeneous within a group, there are 
1,048,576=220  combinations of binomial outcomes generated simply by whether or 
                                                 
10
 The assumption of linearity is not as restrictive as it appears; we can include interaction terms and 
higher-order polynomials in an additively separable way. Such addition does not change the 
discussion below. 
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not 0≥igktV  for the 20 members. About a half of these combinations are associated 
with group-level rejection.11 
Furthermore, in our dataset, group rejection actually occurred for only 7 groups 
(140 individuals). Even if we can write a likelihood function, it is doubtful that we 
would have sufficient degrees of freedom. 
For these reasons, we should abandon the idea of estimating θ  simultaneously 
with group-level decision-making, as in the system of equations (7). Moreover, if our 
main interests are in θ , marginal impacts of observable variables on the individual’s 
benefit from the program, we do not need the system of equations (7). We can simply 
estimate the probit model of equation (6) using the subsample belonging to 69 groups 
that did not reject the program as a group. Using 1,380 observations comprising 1,211 
members who remained in the program ( 1=1igktY ) and 169 members who individually 
rejected the program ( 1=2igktY ), we can estimate a standard probit model. Regarding the 
impact of the microcredit product types, we can enrich the model by estimating the 
probit model separately for each credit product. These separate regressions could 
encounter the classical selection problem if the households self-select themselves into 
each treatment arm. However, because of the experimental setup, treatment allocation 
was exogenously determined by the research team. Therefore, these sets of 
treatment-specific separate regressions should yield consistent estimates without 
                                                 
11
 Here comes the cost of the information constraint mentioned above. If we had known if 0≥igktV  
or 0<igktV  for the individuals with 1=
3
igktY , the likelihood to be calculated would have been 
only for that exact combination (1 combination) instead of about a half million combinations. 
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worrying about the need for selection correction.  
If the actual group-level decision-making is reasonably close to the one shown 
in the simple model of majority voting without member interactions, the probit 
estimation provides us with estimates for marginal impacts of observable variables on 
the individual’s benefit from the program, which are independent of group-level 
decision-making. In other words, the estimates are valid for the entire sample, including 
the group-rejection individuals ( 1=3igktY ). On the other hand, if the actual group 
decisions are not as modeled here, the estimates are still valid as estimates for marginal 
impacts of observable variables on the individual’s benefit from the program, 
conditional on the group favoring group-level participation. The estimates are valid only 
for the subsample (but the majority) with 0=3igktY . Even with this reservation, we 
believe that the estimates are useful.  
The whole section of this analysis is therefore implemented with the probit 
model. The control variable includes: (1) a dummy equal to one if the household is 
specified as being ultra-poor; (2) a dummy equal to one if the household is in the 
treatment group (the reference is the control group); (3) years in the current location; (4) 
a dummy equal to one if the household has ever raised any livestock; (5) the number of 
owned cattle; (6) the value of assets; (7) the household size and the dependency ratio; 
(8) a set of household head characteristics, such as gender, age, and years of education; 
and (9) a district dummy for Gaibandha (the reference is Kurigram district). Clustered 
standard errors at the Char level are employed for all regressions to derive statistical 
inference.  
Let us briefly discuss the expected impacts of control variables on the uptake.       
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Regarding gkD  (dummy variables for randomly-assigned credit product), with the 
reference category ( 0=k ) to be the RC group, we expect 0>/ 1gDf ∂∂  as large credit 
can be divided and used in smaller amounts but the opposite is not possible. Between 
credit type 1 (LC) and 2 (LC+GP), under the assumption of rational consumers, we 
expect 12 />/ gg DfDf ∂∂∂∂  as the grace period provides more flexibility to borrowers. 
Therefore, we expect 0>/>/ 12 gg DfDf ∂∂∂∂ . 
Regarding the attractiveness of credit type 3 (IK+GP) against credit type 2 
(LC+GP), we do not have a priori reason to expect which of 2/ gDf ∂∂  and 3/ gDf ∂∂  is 
larger. The money credit is more flexible, favoring credit type 2, wheares in-kind 
provision is more convenient and associated with low transaction costs, favoring credit 
type 3. 
Regarding igtD  (a dummy variable for randomly-assigned treatment), we 
expect 0>/ 1igDf ∂∂  because receiving the credit immediately is better than waiting for 
a year to receive the credit.  
Among igX  (individual characteristics), aigX , which is associated with higher 
entrepreneurship ability may have 0>/ aigXf ∂∂  for all k  (i.e., additional credit is 
more attractive for those with better ability to use the money productively). This implies 
that those who have more experience of livestock rearing will be more eager to join our 
project.  
 
5. Estimation Results  
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5.1.Factors Associated with Individual Rejection 
Estimated results for individual rejections are presented in Table 3. To interpret 
the results in a straightforward way, the dependent variable takes 1 if respondents accept 
the offer. The observations for this analysis are restricted to those who do not jointly 
reject the offer as a group. Column (1) uses all observations conditional on group 
acceptance. Columns (2) through (5) present the results of the separate regressions for 
each treatment arm.  
The values reflect the marginal effect with respect to a unit change in the 
regressor for continuous variables and to a discrete change from zero to one for dummy 
variables.  
One of the most important results obtained is that, holding other variables 
constant, the probability of program participation is statistically significantly higher for 
non-regular designs than the RC design, by 13 percentage points for the LC group and 9 
percentage points for the LC + GP group, but not for the IK + GP group (Column 1). 
The results generally suggest that the demand for credit by poor households is not 
necessarily small, contrary to the standard presumption in the existing literature (Hulme, 
1999). Our present study does not reveal anything about how large-scale credit induces 
higher default rates. Yet the result at least suggests that if MFIs agree to provide the 
poor with larger loans from the beginning, they will attract more clients from poorer 
segments of the society, which can potentially contribute to reducing extreme poverty. 
Potentially, this particular finding could reflect the technological characteristics 
pervasive in our study area: Smaller livestock animals such as goats are riskier due to 
high morbidity/mortality, while larger livestock animals such as cows have more stable 
returns, a view widely held by farmers and NGO practitioners.  
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This finding raises another question of why the in-kind credit design (i.e., IK + 
GP) is not preferred over cash. In all likelihood, the great advantage of a cash loan 
compared to an in-kind loan is the former’s fungibility. On the other hand, in-kind credit 
is attractive to those who have too little entrepreneurial capacity to select where to 
invest. In the end, as the number of the second type of household becomes greater than 
the number of the first type of household, the cow provision is highly attractive at the 
group level. In our settings, a non-negligible number of households may prefer the 
fungibility of credit because it may be more useful in coping with climate shocks, but 
they do not necessarily lead to group rejections, which are found to be infrequent among 
the in-kind contracts in our sample. 
We have previously discussed, based on popular belief, that being in a control 
group may create an additional reason to reject the offer (dissatisfaction with being 
forced to wait for a long period). The regression results, however, suggest otherwise. 
The probability of individual rejection is significantly higher for persons allocated to a 
treatment group (Columns 1–3).12 Another popular belief, namely that the ultra-poor 
may have lower demand for microcredit, is also not supported by our data. Individual 
rejection rates are significantly reduced among the ultra-poor relative to the moderately 
poor (Columns 1, 4, and 5). This finding also hints that our overall program designs 
may fit well with their demand.  
It is also important to note that the ultra-poor tend to accept the offer if there is 
                                                 
12
 One possible interpretation of this puzzling result is that initial participation decision (to be in our 
experiment) that had been expressed before the second participation decision (after learning about the 
arms and treatment assignments) may be upwardly biased or overly optimistic, and only those who have 
made their decisions seriously from the onset remained in the program. The plausibility of this 
interpretation and the potential effect of self-selection on the repayment rate will be examined in future 
research.  
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a grace period in the repayment schedules. Indeed, the acceptance rates among the 
ultra-poor are significantly higher than the moderately poor under the LC + GP and IK 
+ GP arms (Columns 4 and 5). Combined with the earlier findings that overall uptake is 
higher for the ultra-poor than the moderately poor, the results imply that the ultra-poor 
are attracted more if they do not have to repay loans immediately after they receive 
them. Provided that the ultra-poor tend to be more cautious in taking risks, our results 
are consistent with Field et al. (2013) who find that more risk-averse clients benefit 
more if a grace period is offered in the repayment schedule. Alternatively, our results are 
consistent with the interpretation that the ultra-poor want to have a time buffer before 
having to deal with the challenges generated by the loans. 
Judging from variables of head’s age and its square, middle-aged (i.e., not too 
young and not too old) household heads are more likely to accept our offer and borrow 
credit, especially in the RC and LC + GP groups (Columns 1, 2, and 4). Years of head’s 
education are generally positively correlated with uptake, even though they are not 
statistically significant. Experience of livestock rearing induces participation especially 
in the LC + GP groups (Column 4) probably because those who have experienced 
livestock production have more concrete projects in which to invest, such as a cow, 
and/or have better know-how regarding management. Against our expectation, the 
probability of acceptance in the IK + GP design does not significantly differ between 
those who have experience of livestock production and those who do not. This result is 
not robust, however, as shown below. Also, the number of current cattle holdings does 
not systematically affect the probability of accepting one of the large credit treatment 
arms, i.e., the LC, LC + GP and IK + GP groups.  
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5.2.Heterogeneity Analysis  
Our analysis thus far includes both the treated and control households. As 
repeatedly argued, it is likely that that the reasons for rejection differ between the two. 
As members assigned to the control group had additional reasons to reject program 
participation and the strength of the main reason (dissatisfaction of staying in the group 
without obtaining the credit for a year or so) may differ across treatment arms and 
household characteristics, regressions using only treatment households could offer a 
clearer picture of the attractiveness of different credit types. In other words, it is 
possible that the response of treatment households with respect to rejection or 
acceptance could highly differ from those of control households, differences which may 
not be captured by the dummy variable for the treatment household adopted in Tables 3. 
To address this possibility, Table 4 shows the estimation results of probit models for 
only treatment households. Since the treatment status is randomly assigned to each 
household within the group, our estimation here does not suffer from a selection 
problem.  
While most results are similar to the previous ones, several notable changes are 
observed. First, the IK + GP arm turns out to be positively, though not significantly, 
related to individual acceptance (Column 1). Second, among the treated households, 
male-headed households are more likely to accept the offer individually (Column 1). 
Third, if the households have prior experience of livestock rearing, they are more likely 
to accept the offer (Columns 1, 4, and 5). These three findings seem to reflect 
behavioral consequences when a large amount with a grace period is offered. As can be 
seen in Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4, the coefficients on male-headed dummy and 
experience dummy turn out to be positive and significant in the LC + GP and IK + GP 
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arms. In other words, households headed by males and with previous livestock-rearing 
experiences are more likely to accept if the large loans with grace periods are offered, 
irrespective of whether they are in kind or in cash. Since raising livestock requires 
physical strength, it seems natural that male-headed households prefer this form of 
credit. Female-headed households may also have constraints on market and business 
linkages to gain from large loans. Also, without prior experience of livestock production, 
livestock credit may be burdensome. These results together suggest that the in-kind 
livestock credit requires better targeting. Also, the differences between the overall 
sample and only the treated households reflect the possibility that the latter take the 
decision more seriously because they could actually borrow credit once they agree.  
 
5.3.Factors associated with group rejection 
Are the above findings valid for the entire population under study or only for 
the subsample who jointly accepted our offer as a group? To obtain insights into this 
question, we turn to examine group-level decisions. Theoretically, the group-level 
uptake decision is a function of gigX ∈, , gX , gkD , and gigtD ∈, . However, the number 
of observations is only 76, out of which 69 accepted while 7 rejected. Thus, 
incorporating all of them into explanatory variables is not feasible due to the degrees of 
freedom problem. In addition, since a unit of observation between the group-level 
selection (first stage) and the individual decision (second stage) is different, standard 
Heckman selection-type estimation is not applicable.  
To check for any systematic difference between accepted and rejected groups, 
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therefore, we simply test the mean differences beween those two groups.13 The results 
provided in Table 5 show that only the average years of household head’s education is 
weakly statistically significantly different at the 10% level. Although we do not strongly 
claim that these two groups are the same, we may safely say that they are sufficiently 
similar. Given this similarity, the probit estimation results shown in Tables 3–4 could be 
interpreted as correlates of individual-level acceptance, valid for the entire sample 
including individuals belonging to groups that rejected uptake of the credit scheme. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Given the ultra-poor’s limited access to credit and the paucity of economic 
research on the contract form most suitable for such households in developing countries, 
we know little about what types of credit designs are effective for expanding the 
outreach of microcredit to the ultra-poor. To shed light on this issue, we initiated a field 
experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of 
dwellers can be categorized as the ultra-poor due to periodic floods. We randomly 
offered four types of loans to such dwellers to establish a causal inference: regular small 
loans in cash, large cash loans with immediate repayment, large cash loans with a 
one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with a one-year grace period. Using 
microdata obtained from this experiment, we compared the uptake rates of each loan 
and investigated the correlates of the uptake rates.  
The regression results showed that the uptake rate is significantly lower in the 
regular contract than the other three arms. Contrary to popular belief, we found that 
                                                 
13
 We have also conducted a single regression analysis with probit by replacing one explanatory 
variable with another, and again found that only the average years of household head’s education is 
statistically significant.  
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large-scale loans are preferred even by the ultra-poor, who are usually believed to be 
risk-averse and who demand small-scale loans. Although the overall uptake of in-kind 
credit is significantly lower than equivalently-valued cash credit, the ultra-poor are more 
likely to accept the in-kind offer than the moderately poor. Indeed, a key to attracting 
the ultra-poor is to provide a grace period in the repayment schedule, irrespective of 
whether credit is provided in cash or in kind. It is also found that when offered, in-kind 
(cow) credit was more likely to be accepted if a potential borrower had previous 
experience of livestock rearing, indicating the necessity of supplementary training for 
the ultra-poor. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit offer with a 
one-year maturity period without a grace period is less attractive for the ultra-poor. Our 
results suggest the possibility that microfinance institutions can expand their outreach to 
the ultra-poor by offering them longer maturity loans with convenient grace periods, 
without compromising loan repayment schedules. 
As a thorough study of the suitability of long maturity loans with a grace 
period for the ultra-poor in developing countries, this paper lacks an analysis of the 
impact of contract designs on borrower repayment behavior and their welfare indicators. 
While our field observations indicate that repayment rates have not substantially 
differed across the treatment arms, and some clients with a grace period contract have 
even voluntarily started saving to smooth future repayments, we cannot judge at this 
moment whether the large loans with a grace period benefit both MFIs and their clients. 
As the data collection remains on-going in the field, these issues will be analyzed in 
more detail after appropriate data becomes available. Another remaining issue is 
understanding within-group dynamics of members that led to group rejection. The 
results shown in this paper are reduced-form, with little insight into this issue. Modeling 
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interactions among members, and theoretically and empirically analyzing the case in 
northern Bangladesh also remain for future studies.  
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Figure 1: Satellite Image of Chars located in Northern Bangladesh 
(Note: Blue dots indicate the points where GPS coordinates were measured) 
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Figure 2: Timeline of Interventions and Surveys 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. The blue panels show events regarding interventions, red 
panels show events regarding surveys and the green panels show events regarding sample 
selection . 
 
 
 
Char selection 
[April-May 2012]
Detailed information collection of each village 
belong to the identified Chars
(May-June 2012)
Village selection (80 villages in total)
(June 2012)
PRA method to create the wealth status of all  
residents in each village
(July 2012)
Random offer for microcredit memebrship to eligible villagers. 
Credit group formation, with 20 persons in each group .
(August 2012)
Baseline survey of 80 groups, 1600 households
(September-October 2012)
Announcement of randomization, both 
at the village level and household level
(November 2012)
Continue or discontinue the microcredit memebrship
(Decemeber 2012- April 2013)
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Figure 3: Randomization design 
 
 
Randomly selected 80 villages (out of 128) on Chars
to form microcredit groups. Each group has 20 
members, 14 ultra-poor (UP) and 6 moderately poor 
(MP) households, who are randomly given offer to 
have the group membership.). 
Baseline survey to 1600 households
(4)
20 groups randomly 
selected for IK-GP 
treatment group, 
within each group, 
10 persons are 
selected randomly 
for credit (7 UP and  
3 MP) 
400 houeholds
(3)
20 groups 
randomly selected 
for LC+GP 
treatment group, 
within each group, 
10 persons are 
selected randomly 
for credit (7 UP 
and  3 MP) 
400 houeholds
(2)
20 groups 
randomly selected 
for LC treatment 
group, within each 
group, 10 persons 
are selected 
randomly for credit 
(7 UP and  3 MP) 
400 houeholds
(1)
20 groups 
randomly selected 
for RC treatment 
group, within each 
group, 10 persons 
are selected 
randomly for credit 
(7 UP and  3 MP) 
400 houeholds
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Table 1. Characteristics of sample households and balance test 
 
 
 
 
Total RC LC LC+GP IK+GP 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (=1) 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.500) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Ultrapoor (=1) 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.458) (0.459) (0.459) (0.459) (0.459) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Total HH income ('0000taka) 7.289 7.003 7.355 7.824 6.975 -0.353 -0.821** 0.028 -0.353 -0.821 0.028
(3.760) (3.307) (3.173) (4.754) (3.544) (0.229) (0.290) (0.242) (0.415) (0.610) (0.353)
Agricultural income   ('0000taka) 0.018 -0.008 0.047 0.001 0.033 -0.054* -0.008 -0.041 -0.054 -0.008 -0.041
(0.376) (0.239) (0.481) (0.033) (0.523) (0.027) (0.012) (0.029) (0.030) (0.012) (0.026)
Livestock and poultry income   ('0000taka) 0.169 0.132 0.192 0.166 0.184 -0.060 -0.035 -0.052 -0.060 -0.035 -0.052
(0.488) (0.355) (0.544) (0.498) (0.532) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060)
Non-farm enterprise  ('0000taka) 0.306 0.264 0.149 0.449 0.361 0.115 -0.185 -0.098 0.115 -0.185 -0.097
(1.405) (1.207) (0.848) (1.883) (1.464) (0.074) (0.112) (0.095) (0.085) (0.140) (0.107)
Wage income   ('0000taka) 6.759 6.577 6.932 7.173 6.356 -0.355 -0.596* 0.220 -0.355 -0.596 0.220
(3.870) (3.444) (3.308) (4.911) (3.562) (0.239) (0.300) (0.248) (0.429) (0.646) (0.357)
Non-income   ('0000taka) 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.040 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.133) (0.102) (0.124) (0.167) (0.132) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Poverty (=1) 0.558 0.547 0.530 0.555 0.598 0.018 -0.008 -0.050 0.018 -0.007 -0.050
(0.497) (0.498) (0.500) (0.498) (0.491) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.057) (0.062) (0.054)
Experience of livestock production (=1) 0.476 0.435 0.525 0.482 0.460 -0.090* -0.048 -0.025 -0.090 -0.048 -0.025
(0.500) (0.496) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.059) (0.066) (0.058)
# cattle owned 0.456 0.422 0.448 0.568 0.385 -0.025 -0.145* 0.037 -0.025 -0.145 0.038
(0.950) (0.906) (0.967) (1.072) (0.833) (0.066) (0.070) (0.062) (0.131) (0.124) (0.123)
Value of assets  ('0000taka) 0.221 0.196 0.209 0.273 0.204 -0.012 -0.077* -0.008 -0.012 -0.077 -0.008
(0.441) (0.274) (0.262) (0.722) (0.331) (0.019) (0.039) (0.022) (0.033) (0.044) (0.042)
Sample mean Difference in mean at the
household level
Difference in aggregate mean at
the group level
(1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4)
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Table 1. (cont’d) Characteristics of sample households and balance test  
 
 
Note: The difference is statistically significant at the 1% ***, 5% **, and 10% * level. 
Source: Compiled from the microdata in the baseline survey (same as the following tables). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household size 4.206 4.080 4.235 4.282 4.225 -0.155 -0.202 -0.145 -0.155 -0.202 -0.145
(1.483) (1.490) (1.523) (1.479) (1.435) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.163) (0.172) (0.153)
Dependency ratio 0.862 0.815 0.861 0.862 0.909 -0.045 -0.046 -0.094* -0.045 -0.046 -0.094
(0.616) (0.603) (0.635) (0.598) (0.625) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.049) (0.058) (0.058)
Head's age 38.583 38.925 38.042 38.672 38.690 0.883 0.252 0.235 0.883 0.253 0.235
(10.528) (10.529) (10.533) (9.878) (11.153) (0.745) (0.722) (0.767) (0.989) (1.121) (1.167)
Head is male (=1) 0.899 0.907 0.902 0.897 0.890 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.010 0.018
(0.301) (0.290) (0.297) (0.304) (0.313) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.031) (0.027)
Head's years of schooling 0.748 0.498 0.877 0.660 0.958 -0.380** -0.163 -0.460** -0.380* -0.163 -0.460*
(2.150) (1.816) (2.248) (2.015) (2.445) (0.145) (0.136) (0.152) (0.181) (0.189) (0.216)
Years of current location 5.090 4.185 8.482 3.277 4.415 -4.298*** 0.907 -0.230 -4.297* 0.908 -0.230
(8.654) (8.214) (10.244) (7.369) (7.568) (0.657) (0.552) (0.558) (1.755) (1.188) (1.338)
Gaibandha (=1) 0.750 0.700 0.850 0.700 0.750 -0.150*** 0.000 -0.050 -0.150 0.000 -0.050
(0.433) (0.459) (0.358) (0.459) (0.434) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.133) (0.149) (0.145)
N 1600 400 400 400 400 800 800 800 40 40 40
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Table 2A.  Household-level uptake status by treatment arms and type of rejection 
  # of respondents 
  
Uptake 
Individual 
rejection 
Group 
rejection 
Erosion 
and 
relocation 
Total 
  
RC (traditional) 226 54 80 40 400 
LC (large w/o grace period) 347 13 40   400 
LC+GP (large w grace period) 337 23 20 20 400 
IK+GP (inkind) 301 79   20 400 
Total 1211 169 140 80 1600 
            
if treated           
RC 107 33 40 20 200 
LC 170 10 20   200 
LC+GP 166 14 10 10 200 
IK+GP 149 41   10 200 
          
 
if control           
RC 119 21 40 20 200 
LC 177 3 20   200 
LC+GP 171 9 10 10 200 
IK+GP 152 38         10 200 
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Table 2B. Group-level uptake status by treatment arms and type of rejection 
  # of groups 
  
Group-level uptake, distinguished by the number of 
members within each group who rejected individually 
Group 
rejection 
Erosion 
and 
relocation 
Total 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
and 
more 
Sub-total 
RC 5   1 1 2 1 1     1 2 14 4 2 20 
LC 10 5 1 2               18 2 0 20 
LC+GP 12 1 2 1 1           1 18 1 1 20 
IK+GP 2 7 1 1 1   2 2   1 2 19 0 1 20 
Total 29 13 5 5 4 1 3 2 0 2 5 69 7 4 80 
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Table 3. Correlates of individual-level uptake decisions (including control households) 
  
Dep.var = Uptake dummy 
Full sample RC LC LC+GP IK+GP  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5)  
LC a 0.126*** 
  (0.030) 
LC+GP a 0.089*** 
  (0.034) 
IK+GP a  -0.005 
  (0.043) 
Treatment (=1) -0.036** -0.105* -0.029* -0.014 -0.001 
  (0.016) (0.056) (0.016) (0.024) (0.033) 
Ultra-poor (=1) 0.044** 0.028 0.004 0.041* 0.110** 
  (0.018) (0.053) (0.016) (0.021) (0.051) 
HH size 0.007 0.036 0.002 -0.008 0.033* 
  (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020) 
Dependency ratio -0.011 -0.034 -0.003 -0.001 -0.059 
  (0.014) (0.049) (0.011) (0.018) (0.048) 
Head's age 0.012** 0.037** 0.001 0.016* 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.019) (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) 
Its squared/1000 -0.138** -0.461** -0.020 -0.183* -0.014 
  (0.062) (0.219) (0.028) (0.093) (0.136) 
Head is male (=1) 0.032 -0.146*** -0.010 0.128 0.074 
  (0.036) (0.051) (0.016) (0.088) (0.066) 
Head's years of schooling 0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.002 0.017 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) 
Years of current location -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Experience of livestock production (=1) 0.011 -0.014 0.013 0.029* -0.029 
  (0.018) (0.075) (0.014) (0.016) (0.037) 
# cattle owned 0.016 0.091* 0.017 -0.002 -0.010 
  (0.010) (0.051) (0.010) (0.006) (0.028) 
Value of assets (10 thousands taka) -0.004 -0.039 0.055 -0.016 -0.022 
  (0.019) (0.062) (0.038) (0.014) (0.049) 
Gaibandha (=1) -0.016 0.110 -0.001 -0.031 -0.048 
  (0.032) (0.129) (0.015) (0.035) (0.073) 
  1,380 280 360 360 380 
Notes: Estimated by probit, using the subsample of members whose groups accepted the credit scheme. The parameter 
estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1% ***, 5% **, and 10% * level, using Char-level clustered standard 
error.    
a
 The omitted category is the regular microcredit (RC). 
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Table 4. Correlates of individual-level uptake decisions (using treatment households only) 
  
Dep.var = Uptake dummy 
All treated RC LC LC+GP IK+GP  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5)  
LC a 0.137*** 
  (0.036) 
LC+GP a 0.118*** 
  (0.037) 
IK+GP a 0.018 
  (0.048) 
Ultra-poor (=1) 0.063** -0.010 0.028 0.067* 0.119* 
  (0.027) (0.070) (0.027) (0.036) (0.064) 
HH size -0.009 0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 
  (0.012) (0.040) (0.006) (0.009) (0.031) 
Dependency ratio 0.015 0.089 0.000 0.018 -0.023 
  (0.022) (0.086) (0.017) (0.021) (0.070) 
Head's age 0.020** 0.041 0.003 0.020** 0.011 
  (0.008) (0.031) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) 
Its squared/1000 -0.233** -0.477 -0.053 -0.221** -0.119 
  (0.095) (0.389) (0.047) (0.092) (0.147) 
Head is male (=1) 0.117* -0.210*** -0.002 0.223* 0.272** 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.025) (0.131) (0.131) 
Head's years of schooling 0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.000 0.035* 
  (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.004) (0.019) 
Years of current location -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.009 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Experience of livestock production (=1) 0.061*** 0.068 0.023 0.051** 0.073** 
  (0.022) (0.086) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036) 
# cattle owned 0.010 0.086* 0.019 -0.014 -0.046 
  (0.015) (0.048) (0.013) (0.010) (0.037) 
Value of assets (10 thousands taka) -0.012 -0.020 0.105 -0.021** -0.078 
  (0.032) (0.110) (0.067) (0.008) (0.130) 
Gaibandha (=1) -0.011 0.141 -0.022 0.014 -0.081 
  (0.039) (0.155) (0.018) (0.036) (0.076) 
  690 140 180 180 190 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 5. Comparison of group characteristics 
 
  
Mean (Std.Dev.) of group-level statistics 
accept reject difference 
Group mean       
HH size 4.207 4.114 -0.092 
  (0.474) (0.411) (0.186) 
Head's age 38.591 37.993 -0.598 
  (3.538) (2.692) (1.379) 
Head is male (=1) 0.896 0.929 0.032 
  (0.102) (0.086) (0.040) 
Head's years of schooling 0.798 0.243 -0.555* 
  (0.655) (0.276) (0.251) 
Years of current location 4.949 7.414 2.465 
  (4.821) (9.203) (2.107) 
Experience of livestock production (=1) 0.480 0.400 -0.080 
  (0.202) (0.147) (0.079) 
# cattle owned 0.446 0.329 -0.117 
  (0.392) (0.283) (0.152) 
Value of assets (10 thousands taka) 0.212 0.215 0.003 
  (0.126) (0.075) (0.049) 
Gaibandha (=1) 0.754 0.714 -0.039 
  (0.434) (0.488) (0.174) 
Head's Characteristics       
GHead' age 31.188 31.000 -0.188 
  (6.811) (6.733) (2.699) 
Ghead's years of schooling 2.261 2.143 -0.118 
  (3.151) (3.078) (1.248) 
Ghead' is in treated group (=1) 0.710 0.429 -0.282 
  (0.457) (0.535) (0.184) 
N 79 7   
Note: The difference is statistically significant at the 1% ***, 5% **, and 10% * level. 
